|
|
Saudi Arabia's connections to 9/11 (last updated September 28, 2004)
Fahrenheit 9/11 blames "the Saudis" for the September 11, 2001 attacks. There are some obvious and strong ties between al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia. After all, Osama Bin Laden is a former Saudi citizen, 15 of the 19 hijackers ultimately responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks were from Saudi Arabia, and the foreign terrorist organization al-Qaeda has received large amounts of funding from charities in Saudi Arabia.
Nonetheless, it is arguably unfair to blame "Saudi Arabia" as a country or the "Saudis" as a people for the actions of a few, especially when the Saudi government has taken some actions directly against Bin Ladin and when al-Qaeda's goal is in some part directed against the current Saudi government for its ties to the United States.
Osama Bin Ladin's connections to Saudi Arabia
Osama Bin Laden was born into a wealth Saudi family (not royalty) but has not had close ties to Saudi Arabia for many years. In 1994, his Saudi citizenship was revoked and his financial assets were frozen, cutting him off from his family's fortune.
Bin Laden was the 17th of 57 children of a Saudi construction magnate and he attended Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia. He left Saudi Arabia in 1980 in order to join the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and reportedly has not spent much time in Saudia Arabia since then.
Bin Ladin did return to Saudi Arabia in 1990, a period after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and while al-Qaeda was establishing a base for itself in Sudan. Bin Ladin was in Saudi Arabia when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and reportedly offered his services to the Saudi monarchy in an effort to retake Kuwait, but Bin Laden was rebuffed in favor of the U.S. armed forces. Bin Laden then moved to Sudan in 1991 and spent the next years building his organization.
15 of the 19 Hijackers
Fifteen of the 19 hijackers - including two organizers and most of the "muscle" used to take control of the cockpit and handle passengers - were from Saudi Arabia.
| Hijacker
| Flight
| Role
| Country of Origin
|
| Mohammed Atta
| AA 11
| Pilot
| Egypt, Germany
|
| Abdul Aziz al Omari
| AA 11
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Waleed al Shehri
| AA 11
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Satam al Suqami
| AA 11
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Wail al Shehri
| AA 11
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Hani Hanjour
| AA 77
| Pilot
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Khalid al Mihdhar
| AA 77
| Organizer
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Majed Moqed
| AA 77
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Nawaf al Hazmi
| AA 77
| Organizer
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Salem al Hazmi
| AA 77
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Ziad Samir Jarrah
| UA 93
| Pilot
| Lebanon, Germany
|
| Saeed al Ghamdi
| UA 93
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Ahmed al Nami
| UA 93
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Ahmad al Haznawi
| UA 93
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Marwan al Shehhi
| UA 175
| Pilot
| UAE, Germany
|
| Mohand al Shehri
| UA 175
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Hamza al Ghamdi
| UA 175
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
| Fayez Banihammad
| UA 175
| Muscle
| UAE
|
| Ahmed al Ghamdi
| UA 175
| Muscle
| Saudi Arabia
|
Participants in the conspiracy reportedly have offered different explanations why so many Saudis were used in the attacks.
According to the 9/11 Commission, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, considered the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly told interrogators that so many Saudis were chosen simply because Saudis make up the largest portion of recruits in al-Qaeda training camps (roughly 70 percent).
Many Saudis do have strong feelings against the United States. For example, a Gallup poll taken of about 750 Saudis in December 2001 and January 2002 found that 49% of Saudis polled had a "very unfavorable" view of the United States, and 64% had a "mostly" or "very" unfavorable view. According to the Gallup organization, Saudis saw the United States as pursuing biased policies (65%), had high crime (64%), was aggressive (62%), and was conceited (61%). Only 3% of Saudis saw the United States as friendly or trustworthy. Moreover, only 29% of Saudis thought that better understanding would occur fairly or very quickly and 28% of Saudis thought that better understanding would never come about.
At least one other conspirator, however, reportedly has said that Saudis were chosen specifically to hurt the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Ramzi Binalshibh, who helped plan the attacks but did not participate in the attacks, reportedly told interrogators that al-Qaeda chose so many Saudis to send a message to the United States.
Binalshibh's comments are in line with the Saudi government's own explanation of the Saudi representation in the attacks. Prince Bandar, for example, said in an April 25, 2004 interview with Tim Russert of NBC News (on-line here) that the attack was "an evil work done by evil people who were targeting your country, but also targeting the relationship between our two countries. Otherwise is it accidental that they would choose 15 misguided young people to be out of 19 that when they had the pool of so many people from so many different countries?"
Fund-Raising
Possibly the strongest mark against Saudi Arabia's government is its failure to cut off al-Qaeda from its financial support before the September 11, 2001 attacks and the likelihood that it contributed money to charities that in turn gave money to al-Qaeda.
The Saudi government did freeze Bin Laden out from his family fortune in 1994. Bin Laden was long thought to have financed al-Qaeda's efforts through a personal inheritance of about $300 million which he received when his father died. According to the 9/11 Commission, Bin Laden actually received less than a tenth of that amount spread over nearly a quarter of a century (about $1 million a year from 1970 through 1994) and received no more after 1994.
Nevertheless, it is still believed that al-Qaeda received large amounts of funds from donors in Saudi Arabia. The 9/11 Commission reported that "al Qaeda found fertile fund-raising ground in Saudi Arabia, where extreme religious views are common and charitable giving was both essential to the culture and subject to very limited oversight."
Even so, the 9/11 Commission reported that it "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization," noting also that "[t]his conclusion does not exclude the likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda."
Since September 11, Saudi Arabia reportedly has taken more steps to cut off al-Qaeda's funding, especially after Saudi Arabia itself experienced attacks in May 2003.
U.S. State Department official E. Anthony Wayne testified in a September 25, 2003 Senate hearing (on-line here) that Saudi Arabia had made "fundamental and necessary changes to its banking and charity systems to help strangle the funds that keep al Qaida in business." Wayne noted that Saudi charities cannot deposit or withdraw cash from their bank accounts and cannot make wire transfers abroad, and that the Saudi government has banned the collection of donations at mosques and discouraged the use of collection boxes at retail establishments.
"The Saudis are not where they need to be, and they have much work to do," Wayne testified. "However, we believe they are headed in the right direction, are committed to countering the threat of terrorist financing, and are giving us very strong cooperation in the war on terrorism."
Cooperation
Long before the Sept. 11 attacks, some questioned Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts and its efforts against Osama Bin Laden. According to some sources, such cooperation did not improve immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks despite Saudi Arabia's promises of cooperation and support.
Some people made such criticisms of Saudi Arabia to the House and Senate intelligence committees that conducted an inquiry into the Sept. 11 attacks over the course of 2002. The House and Senate intelligence committees' joint report noted the following:
| "According to a U.S. Government official, it was clear from about 1996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating to Usama Bin Ladin. [ ----------- (about four lines of text redacted) ----------- ], reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Ladin. [ ----------- ] told the Joint Inquiry that he believed the U.S. Government's hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the U.S. Government on this matter is contrary to Saudi national interests. …
"A number of U.S. Government officials complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks. [ ----------- (about two lines of text redacted) ----------- ]. A high-level U.S. Government officer cited greater Saudi cooperation when asked how the September 11 attacks might have been prevented. In May 2001, the U.S. Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with a senior al-Qa'ida operative and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qaida operation. [ ----------- (about two and a half lines of text redacted) ----------- ] . |
Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the United States appears to have improved since it experienced terrorist attacks itself in May 2003 and again in November 2003. Such attacks "spurred an unprecedented level of cooperation with the United States" and the latter attack during the holy month of Ramadan "transformed Saudi public acceptance of the widespread nature of the threat in the Kingdom," the U.S. Department of State noted in its annual terrorism report in early 2004.
Sources: The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United Stats (2004). The Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001," Government Printing Office, S-Rept. No. 107-351, H. Rept. No. 107-792 (December 2002) (on-line here). Richard Burkholder, The U.S. and the West - through Saudi eyes, Gallup organization (August 6, 2002). A transcript of Prince Bandar's Apr. 25, 2004 interview with Tim Russert is on-line here. Testimony of U.S. State Department official E. Anthony Wayne from Sept. 25, 2003 is on-line here. The U.S. Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report for 2003 is on-line here.
back to top
|
|
|
Index / Home
About this site
Updates/Blog
Search via Google
Mailing List
FootnoteTV ®
Best viewed with small text size.
Saudi Arabia
|
|
